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Redmond and Carson: Bloodshed,
Borders and the Union State
Redmond et Carson : l’affrontement, les frontières et l’Union
Alvin Jackson
AUTHOR'S NOTE
The text of this article is drawn from a discourse presented to the Royal Irish Academy on
6 March 2018, and introduced by the Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar TD. The themes of the
article are developed at greater length in Alvin Jackson, Judging Redmond and Carson:
comparative Irish lives (Dublin, Royal Irish Academy, 2018).
 
Introduction
1 These men were the two greatest Irish parliamentarians of their generation: they were
perhaps  the  best-known  Irishmen  of  the  time.  And  their  achievements  –  and  their
mistakes – lastingly shaped the political landscape of modern Ireland and indeed of the
United Kingdom. Their careers say much about the working of the multi-national union
state wherein they found themselves. Their careers, and in particular their role in the
Irish and British Home Rule crisis of 1910-14, speak to other concerns which have a real
contemporary resonance. 
2 They were of course on the face of it political opposites: John Redmond was the leader of
the Irish nationalist parliamentary party from February 1900 through to his death in
March 1918; Edward Carson was the leader of the Irish unionists from 1910 through to
1921, when he became a Law Lord. And yet the parallels between the two are clear. They
were  of  the  same  (mid-1850s)  Irish  generation.  They  were  educated  at  the  same
university,  Trinity College Dublin. They pursued the same profession (the law) in the
same legal circuits.  They sat together for 26 years in the one parliament.  They were
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tireless political opponents, yes, but professed a friendship and mutual respect. One was a
home rule nationalist, the other an Irish unionist; yet they shared some monarchical,
imperial, federalist and indeed anti-suffragist sympathies.1
3 Contemporaries of all kinds – from the king to cartoonists – routinely linked them. Even
their own families – Harry Carson (Edward’s son) and Louis Redmond-Howard (John’s
nephew) – came together in presenting a number of bitter patricidal critiques of their
elders (including a co-written one act melodrama in 1914).2 And yet the two protagonists
of the Home Rule struggle have rarely been brought together analytically.
4 It is notable that where comparative biography of great political rivals is a common place
elsewhere  (there  are,  for  example,  the  several  joint  lives  of  Disraeli  and  Gladstone,
Wellington  and  Napoleon,  Hitler  and  Stalin),  comparative  political  biography  and
comparative political history are relatively underdeveloped genres within modern Irish
historiography. This is perhaps because the kinds of connection which might be made
(say) between constitutional nationalist and physical force separatist or – as in this case –
between nationalist and unionist cut across still acute political sensitivities. 
5 It is also the case that the two “lives” have been separated out by the division of the
island into two popular and opposing political narratives. “Partitionist history” within an
Irish context can be defined partly as dealing with nationalists and unionists exclusively
in  their  separate  silos,  and  ignoring  common  political  environments,  the  cross-
fertilisation of ideas – and cross-communication (however fractious). 
 
Why does all this particularly matter just now?
6 The year 2018 brought the centenary of the death of John Redmond, with a surge of
commemorative activity on the anniversary, 6 March, and the subsequent weeks. But the
era of the third Home Rule bill, and the careers of Redmond and Carson, and the contexts
to their activity, have much contemporary resonance for both Ireland and Britain.
7 This period of Home Rule, so dominated by Redmond and Carson, was one of unusually
intense and concentrated political passion not just for Ireland but for Britain too – and it
serves as a reminder that while the stability of the United Kingdom is often taken for
granted, there has been a history of threatened conflagration and near melt-down. The
tone and content of political discourse over Home Rule in 1910-14 bear some resemblance
to those which have prevailed in Britain over Brexit.3 The period was one of intense and
bitter passion, especially for Carson’s Conservative allies – who were split over Britain’s
trading relationship with the wider world – and in particular over the issue of free trade.
In seeking to “make [Edwardian] Britain great again” the Conservatives in 1912-14 turned to
Irish unionists like Carson with a dangerous passion. 
8 But the era not only defined issues and problems of lasting importance; it also threw up
projected solutions which remain in play. There were different, hard and soft, versions of
what constituted partition, for example (the partition envisioned in 1914 or 1916 was very
different  from that  enacted in 1920-22).  Many,  including both Carson and Redmond,
believed that a federal reform of the British constitution – still very much relevant as a
possibility – might reconcile Irish nationalism to a reformed union or imperial state. 
9 More generally, for some influential 21st century Scots (such as the former First Minister,
Alex Salmond) the struggle of Irish nationalists for Home Rule and independence has
been a frequently cited inspiration. But, it was Charles Stewart Parnell – aggressive and
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charismatic – whose portrait Alex Salmond chose to display in his parliamentary office at
Westminster, and not that of the more emollient and genteel John Redmond.4 In a sense,
therefore, understanding Mr Salmond’s choice of interior decor provides a pointer to
some of the central themes of this essay.
 
Formation and careers: relevance to the cultures of
the Union state the 19th and early 20th centuries 
10 Redmond’s parents were estranged. Carson was the favoured sibling in a relatively stable
family  environment.  And  (while  this  is  not  the  place  to  unravel  the  intricacies  of
attachment theory) it is still likely that these circumstances were linked to Redmond’s
conspicuous  lack  of  wide  networks  of  friends  and  allies  –  as  well  as  to  Carson’s
indomitable self-confidence and theatrical braggadocio.5 
11 Redmond was from the Catholic professional and landed classes and there was money in
his family networks. Carson’s family was arriviste: there are hints of a somewhat louche
quality. Though Carson was a southern Irish Protestant, he was not a landed Protestant;
and there is evidence to suggest that after his father’s death the family were left in “
straitened [financial] circumstances”.6 In other words Redmond was materially secure, but
personally  insecure  in  terms  of  background;  Carson  (on  the  other  hand)  was  well
anchored in his family affections, but he felt materially threatened until the day he died,
leaving in his will the modern equivalent of nearly €10 million. 
12 Redmond and Carson were both lawyers, but here the similarity ended. Carson can be
defined by his social  and professional  role as a lawyer in ways which don’t  apply to
Redmond.  Carson’s  success  in  the  law  courts  generated  leverage  within  a  British
parliament increasingly professional in its makeup and values – even with his enemies.
Indeed Carson’s legal career was reaching its peak at precisely the moment that Home
Rule was returning to centre stage (in 1910): he defended George Archer-Shee,  the “
Winslow boy” of Terence Rattigan’s later (1946) drama, in early 1910.7
13 Recent history weighed heavily with each in terms of their outlook and strategies. Part of
the problem with Redmond was the extent to which the legacy both of Charles Stewart
Parnell and of the profound “split” within constitutional nationalism (1891-1900) after the
latter’s death weighed down upon him. This illuminates his own relentless concern for
unity. But in some ways Redmond was loyal to the letter but not necessarily to the spirit
of Parnellism. Carson (who was occasionally compared to Parnell by contemporaries) was
clearly influenced by a particular historical reading of successive British governments’
willingness to respond to Irish political mobilisation.
14 Finally, each of them was a compromise leader, and each was circumscribed by this. Each
of them was in some ways marginal to the central concerns of the parties that they ended
up leading – Redmond as a Parnellite in a largely anti-Parnellite united party, Carson as a
southern unionist  in  a  largely  northern  unionist  movement.  The  resulting  limits  on
Redmond’s freedom of manoeuvre are well-known; but there was also a considerable
distance  between  Carson’s  public  certainties  over  the  union  and  his  much  more
circumspect private behaviour in 1910-14. 
15 Each of the men worked with a particular set of personal legacies; but each also worked
within,  and  was  defined  by,  a  particular  type  of  political  environment.  One  way  of
thinking about Redmond and Carson, and the social and political roles that they occupied,
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is to look at the structure of the state in which they operated. Those union states, like the
UK, which emerged in the late 18th and early 19th centuries were often created in similar
circumstances, against the backdrop of European warfare, and they shared some common
characteristics. This is not the place to reflect at length about the conceptualisation of
union, but a couple of fundamental points are worth highlighting. 
16 The  UK  (like  other  united  kingdoms)  was  of  course  an  asymmetrical  union  –  one
overwhelmingly “predominant partner” (to use the language of Lord Rosebery) and several
(like Ireland and Scotland) much smaller. It was also an imperfect or an incomplete union
– in so far as distinctively Scottish or Irish institutions remained after 1707 and 1801. 
17 Empire was conceptually relevant to these union states, in so far as they were not only
often connected to overseas colonisation, but were sometimes founded upon forms of
internal colonialism.8 The types of governance which they sustained and the kinds of
political  culture  also  overlapped with empire:  in  the  Irish  case  there  was  a  viceroy,
favoured social and political classes through whom government was largely sustained,
and  complex  or  hybrid  political  cultures  which  were  often  pulled  between  the
metropolitan power as well as local traditions. Partition (as in Bengal in 1905) was also an
imperial stratagem which was ultimately applied to Ireland.
18 As the historian K.T. Hoppen has recently reminded us all, the politics of the Westminster
elite  through  much  of  the  period  of  union  were  characterised  often  by  a  relative
ignorance of Ireland and of the union and by a relative lack of any lastingly coherent
vision of union. This expressed itself in cyclical shifts between integrationist approaches
to the government of Ireland and exceptionalist or even devolutionist approaches.9 
19 Moreover,  Irish politicians,  whether nationalist  or unionist,  fought for attention, and
then fought to educate or inform British ministers and party leaders. The corollary of this
was the deepening of political division within Ireland itself, since the competing parties
tended to look for external support and validation rather than internal reconciliation.
But there was little of this pathology that was unique to Britain and Ireland: for example,
Austrian politics  in the later decades of  the Dual  Monarchy have been described (by
Steven Beller) as an evermore “vertical hierarchical system – where the parties bargained with
the government […] rather than with each other […]; the aim of the game was to put one over on
the opponent rather than to come to a compromise with him.”10 This – in essence – was the “
system” in place in Ireland. 
20 How does all of this relate to Redmond and Carson? Redmond and Carson had a low-key
but persistent  friendship from about 1890.  But  there was a striking absence in their
political relationship: there is little to suggest that – despite all of the ties mentioned
earlier – they had much direct negotiation with each other particularly when their British
allies were not present. Each of them looked primarily to the British parties to represent
their cause.
21 For each this carried an ongoing risk of dependency or clientelism – which in the past was
only off-set  by  highly  combative  constitutional  nationalist  leaders  such  as  Daniel
O’Connell  and  Parnell  –  or  through  the  studied  defiance  of  the  militant  separatists
enrolled within the Irish Republican Brotherhood (or Fenians). There were also (as we
will see) clear distinctions between the ways in which Carson navigated the politics of the
union parliament and government, and Redmond’s ways.
22 Carson  had  a  critical  advantage  –  British  Conservatism  relied  upon  the  union  as  a
unifying mechanism since the party was otherwise still wrangling over tariff reform and
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free trade, and over its leadership in 1910-11. In addition the Conservatives’ embroilment
in Ulster obscures the fact that Carson had partly liberated himself from Westminster
politics through the popular political mobilisation which had occurred in the north after
1911-12. The central irony of the period was of course that the strength of Redmondite
nationalism hinged largely  upon its  position in the British parliament,  while  that  of
unionism now lay in Ireland itself. 
23 Redmond’s essential difficulty was that he was coping with a still fragile constitutional
nationalist  tradition  (nominally  –  but  only  nominally  –  united  after  the  internal
conflagrations of the 1890s), and seeking to collaborate with a broadly united Liberalism
which was sympathetic towards, but not passionate about Home Rule. Moreover, it was a
Liberalism which  believed  that (as  Asquith  said  in  1913)  “the  Nationalists  without  the
support of the Liberal Party were powerless.”11
24 Redmond’s relative weakness was expressed in terms either of lack of communication
from Liberal  ministers,  debilitating partial  affirmation,  or  broken promises  (this  was
particularly clear in the negotiations of February/March 1914 and of June/July 1916). This
relative weakness was also directly expressed in terms of discourse. His vocabulary and
pitch  (in  dealing  with  ministers)  were  often,  seemingly,  those  of  a  supplicant.  He
frequently  deployed  the  language  of  “fair  play.”12 A  characteristic  motif  of  his
correspondence was anxious petitioning: a characteristic tone, on the other hand, was
offended  gentility.  Even  Redmond  himself  recorded  on  occasion  that  he  felt  “really
humiliated in having to run after them [British ministers] in the way I have done.”13 All this was
not a feature of Parnell’s communication – nor, for that matter, of Carson’s. A striking
contrast between how the two men navigated the British establishment came with their
respective  meetings  with  Lord  Kitchener  on  6/7  August  1914:  Carson  responded  to
Kitchener’s various threatening suggestions with a sarcastic “you’re a damned fine fellow”
and “I’d like to see you try”;  while Redmond gently recorded that he had been “rather
disquieted” by his parallel conversation with Kitchener.14 “Rather disquieted” and “I’d like to
see you try” are an eloquent conjunction or introduction to their two styles.
25 Turning finally to wider contexts – most analyses of the survival or demise of union states
or multinational empires of the 19th century stress the role of monarchy and loyalty and
its associated institutions (like the army) as critical binding agents and as engines of a
supranational state identity (Oszkár Jászi, the Hungarian-born sociologist of the Austro-
Hungarian empire, stressed the role of the Habsburgs as a key “centripetal” force, and
more recent work by Pieter Judson and others has done likewise).15 Work on the
Bernadotte monarchy in the United Kingdoms of Sweden-Norway points to a similar set
of unifying functions.16 Both Redmond and Carson were primarily Irish in terms of their
identity  (indeed  Carson  was  sometimes  accused  of  stage-Irishness);  but  each
acknowledged  a  supranational  set  of  imperial  and  monarchical  loyalties.  Redmond’s
monarchism and imperialism and commitment to the British war effort are generally
seen  unflatteringly  or  uncomprehendingly  in  the  context  of  either  unionism or  (by
contrast) a purist republican separatism. But there is a case for understanding him partly
by looking back to the O’Connellite tradition of nationalist “loyalty”; and also partly by
looking  sideways  to  a  wider  European phenomenon of  nationality  and  state  loyalty,
brokered through the agency of the crown and its institutions. 
26 Redmond’s  –  and  Carson’s  –  fundamental  characteristic  was  that  they  reflected  the
hybridity of Irish political culture under the union – the janus-faced looking to union or
imperial  as  well  as  national  themes.  This  again  is  only  surprising  if  judged  by  the
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standards of an essentialist Britishness or Irishness – or judged from the standpoint of an
uncompromisingly  partitioned Ireland.  And indeed,  work on identity  in  other  multi-
national  union states conventionally emphasises the contingency and negotiability of
identity – as well as its linkages and layers.17 
 
Bloodshed
27 Violence,  whether real  or threatened,  was also a common feature of  Europe’s  united
kingdoms of the 19th century. This should scarcely surprise, since these supranational
unions were being constructed at precisely the moment of mounting national sentiment
across the continent. And each of the two careers poses questions about how essentially
constitutional  politicians  operate  in a  society where there are strong cultures  either
celebrating  or  practising  violent  political  resistance.  A  number  of  points  may  be
highlighted in illuminating this theme.
28 To  start  with,  a  water-tight  distinction  between  “constitutionalist”  and  “militant”  in
modern Irish history is generally hard to sustain. There is in fact some analytical value
behind Seán Lemass’ notion (applied to the newly founded Fianna Fáil party in 1926) of
being “slightly constitutional.”18 
29 Why did Redmond shift to a greater militancy in 1913-14, as the political crisis over Irish
Home Rule developed? He did so firstly, of course, as a response to unionist mobilisation
in the north of Ireland. But the question has also to be grasped in terms of his own long-
standing relationship with physical force nationalism, and in particular with the Irish
Republican Brotherhood (or Fenian movement). He had a strong sense of the history of
national insurgency and was at the forefront of the centenary commemoration of the
1798 Rising. He built links with Fenians and Fenianism in the 1890s. The issue was not
therefore that his relationship with the militants was ever absent. But Redmond’s closest
links  with  Fenianism had come in  the  1890s  –  and by  1914  he  had a  conception of
Fenianism which was both outmoded and incomplete.
30 Moreover, Redmond did not absolutely oppose political violence in principle; but he saw
conditions in which the Irish might legitimately resort to arms. There are overlaps here
with Catholic – Thomist and other – teaching on the notion of the just war. One aspect of
his reasoning certainly related to the overwhelming strength of British firepower, the
impracticality of any Irish assault – and the inevitability of bloody Irish defeat.19 
31 Why was Redmond evidently so unimpressed by unionist militancy in 1912-14? This was
essentially  because  he  believed  that  he  understood  and  shared  their  strategic
calculations. In 1908 he wrote that “there are friends of ours who say that any violent action in
Ireland will alienate support here [in Britain]. But the sounder view is that you have got, in some
way or another, once more to impress the English mind that the Irish question is a real, urgent, one.
”20 In Redmond’s view Carson’s militants were bluffing in 1912-14 because like him they
understood  that  tackling  the  military  might  of  the  British  empire  would  produce  a
bloodbath; but he also “knew” that they were bluffing because he saw that they, like Irish
nationalists, were primarily seeking to “impress the English mind” through their militant
postures.
32 Why, then, did Carson shift to militancy in 1910-14? The answer to this rests partly again
with “impressing the English mind”. But unionist militancy came at the end of a long period
of northern reorientation towards local organisation and initiative.21
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33 Did Carson introduce the gun into Irish politics? He unquestionably helped to illegally
introduce large numbers of guns into Ireland and its politics. There is certainly a case for
saying that he introduced the gun into Redmondite politics. But of course he was not the
first militant Irish politician, or the first to threaten the British government with armed
insurgency. In the end the key point about Carson and militancy was not primarily that
he was the first to introduce guns into Irish politics. It was rather that he was the first
who deliberately wanted to be seen introducing guns into Irish politics.22
 
Were Carson and Redmond the effective architects of
the partition of the Ireland?
34 Neither Carson nor of course Redmond invented partition as a concept,  or even as a
concept with an Irish application. It was in fact privately mooted with the first Home Rule
bill in 1886, and had been given imperial applications before 1912. 
35 As is  very well  known,  Carson was  a  driver  of  partition,  while  Redmond reluctantly
acquiesced in an increasingly difficult range of partitionist proposals forced upon him by
his Liberal allies. As is relatively well known, they were ultimately divided not by the
principle  of  partition,  which  Redmond  loathed,  and  Carson  disliked,  but  by  its
practicalities and potential application: Carson sought ultimately the indefinite exclusion
from Home Rule  of  the  six  counties  which became Northern Ireland,  while  by  1916
Redmond was prepared to countenance a term-limited or otherwise clearly “temporary”
exclusion. 
36 But a number of under-explored issues are worth highlighting, especially perhaps given
contemporary concerns. Part of the problem in dealing with partition in Irish history is
that it is such a heavily freighted and teleological term; but the Brexit debates arising
from the “backstop” over the Irish border have served to underline that there is – and has
been – no single definition of either partition or its associated frontiers. Home Rule, as
defined in 1914, did not give an Irish parliament any untrammelled right to disrupt free
trade. Therefore, opting out of Home Rule did not create an economic or necessarily a “
hard” political border any more than such existed between Northern Ireland and Britain
in the years of devolution.  It  was not eastern Ulster opting out of Home Rule which
created the form of partition which we have been living with in Ireland for a century; it
was rather eastern Ulster opting out of the revolution. 
37 In some ways partition was an example of the law of unintended consequences in politics.
For Carson partition was a tactic which became a compromise which was reimagined as a
fundamental goal: the unity of Ireland was pragmatically replaced in 1914-16 by the idea
of a soft border and then almost accidentally in 1920-21 by a hard border. Carson began as
an  all-Ireland  unionist  who  long  knew  that  the  concentrated  industrial  wealth  and
unionism of the north-east posed a problem for Liberal Home Rulers. Only from about the
autumn of 1913 onwards did he look seriously at partition as a meaningful compromise
position.23 And only from 1920 did he publicly and retrospectively define partition as the
immutable objective of northern unionism. 
38 For Redmond partition was an anathema and remained an anathema. He and his senior
lieutenant, John Dillon, had a particularly well-organised northern support base through
the charismatic  Belfast  nationalist,  Joseph Devlin;  and party and national  unity were
fundamental to his vision of politics in the wake of the Parnell Split. One of the central
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planks in the posthumous defence case for Redmond (mounted by Dillon) was that he had
fought partition tooth and nail – and had left Ireland united at the time of his death in
1918.24 
39 Indeed, while Redmond and Carson were famously opposed on the national question, they
both tentatively explored (as many do within the UK today) federalism (or explicitly
shared sovereignty) as a means of bridging their political positions. For Carson federalism
was a means of creating an Irish parliament within the overall context of a reformed
union government of  the United Kingdom. For Redmond,  federalism was a means of
redefining the government of the whole empire. But federalism also worked for Redmond
within an Irish environment, allowing the possibility of the north enjoying a distinctive
status but within an all-Ireland rather than a British context. Here again Redmond was
simultaneously looking forward to later (often republican) thought on the shape of an all-
Ireland state; but he may also have been looking back to the precedent of other European
composite monarchies like Austria-Hungary, and to the Home Rule relationships (such as
those enjoyed by Croatia)  within the two halves of  that  state.  In short,  federalism –
whether in 1914 or now – offered a common vocabulary and a hope of bipartisanship
which perhaps masked conceptually very different approaches and goals. 
40 Linked with this, Redmond and Carson each looked beyond national borders to wider
supranational  and (in  the  case  of  Redmond)  diasporic  concerns.  Redmond sought  to
balance the power of London using the devices of the empire and the Irish diaspora.
Strikingly, Carson did not have the same vision of empire as did Redmond – nor did he
have the same active and constructive engagement with colonial ministerial networks
and communities. Ultimately, Carson talked the talk about empire; but it was Redmond
who envisioned and practised it. 
41 We know of course that Redmond’s vision of Irish self-government was superseded by
that of Sinn Féin and that he died 100 years ago, a disappointed man. We know, too, that
Carson shifted gradually from an all-Ireland unionism to a six-county exclusionist  or
partitionist stance. But Carson’s public acceptance of the role of patriarch of Northern
Ireland  (which  flourished  in  the  1930s)  concealed  a  profound  bitterness  about  the
condition of all of Ireland in the 1920s. 
42 This was repeated in private communications: in 1918 Carson wrote privately that he had
“already  agreed  to  the  exclusion  of  six  counties,  although  I  think  that  arrangement
unstatesmanlike and a poor solution.” Despite his standing as patriarch of Northern Ireland
he wrote in 1922 that “I feel I am a citizen without nationality or anything to be loyal to.” In
1928 he confided that he thought “there’d be more decency in a Republic than in this [Free
State] humbug. In fact I’d rather see a republic.” He claimed in private at this time that “
looking back at politics, I think we made a great mistake in not accepting Mr Gladstone’s first Home
Rule bill.”25 
43 The difference between Carson and Redmond on partition was in the end essentially the
difference between explicitly arguing and implicitly thinking in partitionist terms – or
(alternatively) the difference between disliking and loathing partition. 
 
Conclusion
44 After a century it is surely worth reuniting Redmond and Carson analytically. In reality
neither could ever wholly be understood without recourse to the other. Nor can each be
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fully  understood  without  some  recourse  to  the shape  and  functioning  of  the  multi-
national union state. Redmond’s approach to a succession of fundamental issues – such as
militancy and partition and the endorsement of the war effort – was at least in part
influenced by Carson’s actions and strategies. Carson’s own actions in key areas were
partly  conditioned  by  a  particular  view of  Irish  nationalism and the  ways  in  which
successive union governments operated. Redmond had vision, but lacked passion; Carson
lacked vision, but could provide the theatrical passion in spadeloads.
45 Redmond on the whole played by the parliamentary and political rule-book, including the
opaque  Parnellite  rule-book;  he  became  the  key  executor  of  the  great  man’s  highly
fraught and ambiguous legacies. He sought for consistency and honour in his private and
public dealings. Carson bent and broke rules and revelled in contradictions while all the
while proclaiming his directness,  simplicity and consistency.  Yet he was at times the
lawless lawyer; the disloyal loyalist; the all-Ireland partitionist. He bequeathed complex
legacies to his compatriots in the North, including legacies of dangerous brinkmanship.26
He simultaneously  embraced  and owned his  standing  as  a  state-builder  in  Northern
Ireland – while privately complaining at length about the new dispensations of the 1920s. 
46 Ireland for long has been a land of secret histories, of hybridity and liminality, where the
reality of political experience has sometimes been buried, and often kept far apart from
the ideal. The ideal has been a treasured vision of pristine political struggle: the reality
has often involved day-to-day compromises with power, ambiguous family heritages and
quotidian  and  understandable  (if  not  very  glamorous)  struggles  for  survival  and
betterment. Edward Carson lived long enough to rewrite his own history, and thereby to
mask the shifts and failures in his political life: he lived long enough to impose a form of
consistency on a long and inconsistent career whose central themes were simultaneously
the law and the breaking of the law. 
47 It was John Redmond’s tragedy that he all too clearly embodied compromise, ambiguity
and struggle. But at the same time these complexities also reflected the reality of much
individual  and  collective  Irish  historical  experience.  And  herein  lie  both  Redmond’s
authenticity and his importance for us all today.
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ABSTRACTS
John  Redmond  and  Edward  Carson  together  dominated  the  politics  of  Irish  Home  Rule  and
unionism between 1910 and 1918, and were major influences on Irish and British politics for an
even longer period than this. Yet though contemporaries routinely viewed them together, and
though they had a strong political and personal relationship, the hermeneutics of much modern
Irish  historical  scholarship  have  precluded  any  systematic  comparison.  In  fact,  comparing
Redmond  and  Carson  provides  important  new  illumination  on  the  central  themes  of  their
careers, as well as on the political cultures of the multi-national union state within which they
each operated. 
John Redmond et Edward Carson ont tous les deux dominé les débats engendrés par la question
du Home Rule et par l’unionisme entre 1910 et 1918, et ils ont eu une influence majeure sur la vie
politique irlandaise et britannique pendant une période encore plus longue. Et pourtant, alors
que leurs contemporains les associaient communément l’un avec l’autre et qu’ils entretenaient
des  relations  personnelles  et  politiques  fortes,  l’herméneutique  qui  caractérise  l’essentiel  de
l’historiographie de l’Irlande moderne a empêché toute comparaison systématique entre les deux
hommes. En réalité, comparer Redmond et Carson permet de mettre en lumière de façon inédite
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ce qui constitua les thématiques centrales de leurs carrières et les cultures politiques de cet état
né de l’Union de plusieurs nations dans lequel ils vécurent.
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